The Majority Chief Whip and Member of Parliament (MP) for South Dayi, Rockson-Nelson Dafeamekpor, accused the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of political bias in a post on X on September 11, 2026.
The MP suggested that the Fund does not apply the same level of scrutiny it subjects successive National Democratic Congress (NDC) governments to as compared to governments of the main opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP).
His post referenced two recent IMF reports, the Selected Issues report and the Technical Assistance report on State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).
“I have observed, rather disconcertingly, the alacrity with which the IMF criticises an NDC-Govt in respect of matters that they’ll actually facilitate for an NPP-Govt to implement,” the post read in part.
“Mr IMF Country Director, by your tainted GoldBod report a couple of weeks prior and your present report in question, tells me without doubt that, you have descended into the local political arena of conflict and taken sides opposite to me. You must never be trusted again as an independent and neutral supra-national financial institution,” he added.
The MP’s critique was premised on a media report that highlighted IMF’s recommendation around political appointments to boards of key state institutions, including the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority (GPHA) and COCOBOD.
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The Citi Newsroom story Dafeamekpor shared with his comment, titled “IMF questions political appointments to SOE boards, cites GPHA chairman as example,” was based on the IMF Technical Assistance Report released on September 8, 2026.
In this report, GhanaFact highlights two things: situating the recent IMF report in context and laying out the key remarks about appointments to SOEs. We also fact-check two claims the MP made about the IMF.
Context: A report based on government’s request
First, it is important to emphasise that the Fund’s Technical Assistance Report was prepared at the request of the government, through the Ministry of Finance, contrary to suggestions by Rockson-Nelson Dafeamekpor that the agency is interfering in the affairs of Ghana’s state enterprises.
“At the request of the Ministry of Finance of Ghana (MOF), the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) mission visited Accra between November 24 and December 5, 2025, to provide targeted capacity building in reviewing financial performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), applying fiscal risks management tools, and analysing institutional arrangements for SOE oversight,” the report noted.
Typically, such reports seek to evaluate a country’s institutional strengths and provide practical policy recommendations to build economic and financial management capacity.
Data analyst Alfred Appiah also weighed in on the Majority Chief Whip’s post, highlighting that the Finance Ministry requested technical assistance from the IMF to review the financial performance of state-owned enterprises, and analyze the institutional arrangements for SOE oversight.
“The IMF visited Ghana, engaged the heads of key SOEs, and prepared a report. If you read the report, it highlights some of the positives in the progress Ghana has made, while also identifying the key risks and areas that still need attention. So why is a top legislator of the governing party reacting like this?,” he asked in an X post.
Two claims fact-checked: Did the IMF issue a report on GoldBod and does Ghana sell gold to the Fund?
Points 5 and 6 of Dafeamekpor’s post further claimed that the IMF issued a “tainted GoldBod report” and that Ghana will no longer sell its gold to the global financial institution.
Both are factually inaccurate. The IMF did not issue a report on GoldBod. The recent report Dafeamekpor attempts to refer to is the August 2026 Article IV Consultation and proposed Policy Coordination Instrument document and another (titled GHANA SELECTED ISSUES) which highlights in part, losses made by the Bank of Ghana under the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme (DGPP).
Available records show that Ghana does not sell its gold to the IMF. The country trades or exports gold largely with countries such as the UAE, Switzerland, India, South Africa, and China.
What exactly did the report say about SOE appointments?
Despite the MP’s reaction having been triggered by a news report referred to above, it is instructive to note that the Fund highlighted a wide range of recommendations on corporate governance, some of which identified what the entities were doing well and areas that required improvement.
For instance, in the GPHA case, it noted that the entity has stronger stakeholder representation on its Board, and a Board size broadly within international good practice.
“COCOBOD and GPHA historically had around eleven members, though the new GPHA board has nine; and ECG’s board is of similar size. In all four entities, boards combine one executive (the CEO) with a majority of non‑executive members, matching OECD expectations on board size and the predominance of non‑executives. The primary concern pertains to the qualifications of the non-executives rather than their number,” the report stated (see page 40).
“GPHA’s board deliberately includes port users and logistics stakeholders, such as the Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, shipowners and port workers, alongside the Ministry of Transport and other state agencies,” the report also said (see page 41).
Other entities, such as VRA, were cited as having a transparent committee architecture, which aligned with OECD good practice on active, professional and accountable boards.
“VRA’s annual reports and governance materials describe a suite of board committees, including Audit & Risk, Finance & Investment and Services & Employee Relations, with earlier reports also referring to an Engineering & Operations committee, all of which meet regularly and handle detailed preparatory work before full board decisions,” the report said (see page 42).
Selected critiques and recommendations from the report
| Critique | Recommendations |
| Boards of major SOEs are largely dominated by political appointees, with board chairs frequently being ministers, members of parliament, or prominent party officials | Addressing these gaps will require operationalising a merit-based nomination framework, reducing political presence on boards, enforcing the Code of Corporate Governance, and mandating systematic disclosure |
| CEO appointments remain largely political, with SOE boards playing a limited role, which weakens the accountability link between SOE board oversight and management performance. | The OECD Guidelines recommend that boards be given clear authority and responsibility to appoint and dismiss CEOs based on performance and in line with the company’s long‑term interests. |
| Limited public disclosure of the criteria used for appointments or the outcomes of evaluations. | The Ministry of Finance should actively participate in SOE boards’ merit-based appointments, strengthening spending controls, and enforcing transparent reporting and oversight. |
| Majority of Ghanaian SOEs struggle with financial reporting and audit timelines | Review the SOE portfolio, re-classify all entities to appropriate categories: (i) commercial or having potential to operate commercially; (ii) mixed mandates; and (iii) general government units |
| Board processes at the Ghanaian SOEs show a gap between formal requirements (schedule of meetings, evaluations, codes of ethics) and actual practice | To ensure fiscal sustainability and effective governance for SOEs, Ghana must shift from policy frameworks to enforceable, performance-based practices. |
| Ghana’s ownership and corporate governance framework for SOEs are broadly aligned with international standards, but implementation gaps persist. | Review the State Ownership Policy and critically evaluate the Policy alignment of each entity; prepare grounds for policy decisions |
GhanaFact observed that throughout the IMF report, its critiques of SOE Board appointments appear to be benchmarked against the OECD SOE Guidelines, which are an international standard for helping governments manage and govern state-owned enterprises.
Ghana’s CRC agrees with IMF on Board appointments
The IMF’s position on SOE Board appointments are almost no different from the findings and recommendations of the 2025 Constitution Review Committee.
Like the IMF, the Committee found excessive politicisation, weak meritocracy, and poor performance management across the public service and state-owned enterprises, and recommended among others the reduction of partisan influence in public appointments; and introduction of constitutional governance standards for state-owned enterprises.
Conclusion
The MP’s accusations of political bias against the IMF for a report the government formally requested exposed a lack of appreciation for its contents. The Technical Assistance report was directly requested by Ghana’s Ministry of Finance to evaluate SOE oversight, not an unsolicited political intervention. Furthermore, his claims regarding a “tainted GoldBod report” and gold sales to the IMF are factually incorrect. Ultimately, the IMF’s recommendations on depoliticizing SOE boards align with international OECD benchmarks and echoes Ghana’s 2025 Constitution Review Committee findings aimed at strengthening national governance.
By Gifty Danso
